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WHEN IS A SECURITY NOT A SECURITY?
PROMISSORY NOTES, LOAN PARTICIPATIONS,
AND STOCK IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
After nearly half a century, the proper interpretation of the
statutory definition of a security in the Securities Act of 1933' ('33 Act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 ('34 Act) remains uncer-
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976). The statutory definition of a security in the Securities
Act of 1933 ('33 Act) provides:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires- ...
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, cer-
tificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,-gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of inte:est or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing.
Id. at § 77b(1) (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1976). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) defines a
security as follows:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires--
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id. at § 78(c)(10) (1976).
Although the statutory definition of a security under the '33 Act differs slightly from
the statutory definition of a security under the '34 Act, the two definitions functionally are
equivalent. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) (defini-
tions are synonymous for the acts' coverage); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342
(1967) (definitions virtually identical); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) (defini-
tions substantially identical). The definition of a security in the proposed Federal Securities
Code, and in the Uniform Securities Act adopted in over 35 states, virtually is identical to
the statutory definitions in the '33 and '34 Acts. See ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 299.53
(Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 15, 1978); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(1), reprinted in BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4931, at 727 (1971).
In addition to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there
are four other major federal securities statutes with similar definitions of a security. See
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1976) (regulations for public offer-
ings of trust indentures); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6
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tain. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statutory definition of
a security 4 have created unlimited opportunities for academic discus-
sion.' Judges and practicing attorneys, however, struggle to harmonize
academic theory with the realities of modern business transactions." An
examination of recent cases concerning whether promissory notes,' loan
participations,' and stock in close corporations9 are securities under the
federal securities laws reveals that the confusion surrounding the defini-
tion of a security results from the use of different analyses by the courts
to determine if a transaction involves a security. ' °
(1976) (protection for investors in security transactions involving public utility); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1976) (regulations for investment corpora-
tions); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1976) (regulations for
brokerage firms and investment advisors).
' See, e.g., Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 642-43 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (Supreme Court's use of term "security" is ambiguous and uncertain); FitzGib-
bon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Finan-
cial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FitzGibbon] (definition of
a security is "muddy"); Newton, What Is A Security: A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167,
167 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Newton] (definition of a security is shrouded in ambiguity);
Peloso & LaBella, Determining If Discretionary Customer Accounts Are Securities, 9 SEC.
REG. L.J. 307, 307 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Peloso & LaBellal (definition of a security is
elusive concept).
The legal foundations of the '33 and '34 Acts create much of the confusion surrounding
the definition of a security. See FitzGibbon, supra, at 894-95. The acts largely are revisions
of the law of contracts. Id. As contract law developed into branches identified by the nature
of the items transferred or the nature of the relationships established, nineteenth century
lawyers began to classify transactions as specific types, such as loans or partnerships. Id. at
894-95. See generally J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1st ed.
1842). Since the legal profession today no longer rigidly classifies transactions into specific
types, definitions of a security that merely name particular instruments promote confusion
in an area praised for its maturity and precision. FitzGibbon, supra, at 895.
See generally Marine Bank v. Weaver, U.S. -,50 U.S.L.W. 4285 (March
9, 1982) (certificate of deposit); International Bhd. of Teamsters v Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)
(pension plan); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) ("stock" in housing
project); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (dividends on profits); SEC v. United
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (flexible fund annuity contracts); SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contracts); SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (land sales and service contracts); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leas-
ing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (interests in land). See also text accompanying notes 41-58 in-
fra (discussion of Supreme Court's analysis of a security).
' See Newton, supra note 3, at 167 (ambiguous definition of a security evokes enter-
taining legal pirouettes for academic discussion); Peloso & LaBella, supra note 3, at 307
(definition of a security is center of substantial commentary).
' See Peloso & LaBella, supra note 3, at 307 (definition of a security is center of inordi-
nate amount of litigation).
' See text accompanying notes 66-104 infra (discussion of promissory note as
securities).
' See text accompanying notes 105-41 infra (definition and discussion of loan participa-
tion agreements).
' See text accompanying notes 143-72 infra (discussion of the sale of entire businesses
as securities).
," See text accompanying notes 149-55 infra (sale of stock in close corporation is
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Courts use two types of analyses to determine if a transaction in-
volves a security." Some courts find a security present in a transaction
simply by finding that the transaction involves an instrument expressly
enumerated in the statutory definition. 2 Other courts look beyond the
literal language in the statutory definition and examine the cir-
cumstances surrounding a transaction to determine if the federal
securities laws apply. 3 The dichotomy in analyses of alleged securities
transactions often results in an instrument being a security in one
jurisdiction and not a security in another jurisdiction.'4 The severe con-
sequences of violating the federal securities laws, however, demand a
uniform interpretation of the statutory definition of a security.
1 5
Current interpretations of the statutory definition of a security
create uncertainty as to whether many arms-length business transac-
tions involve a security. 8 Businessmen, unhappy with a financial transac-
tion, often try to exploit the uncertainty surrounding the proper inter-
pretation of the definition of a security by alleging violations of the
federal securities laws.1 For example, plaintiffs barred by contributory
securities transaction under literal analysis); text accompanying notes 156-72 (sale of stock
in close corporation is not securities transaction under substantive approach); text accompa-
nying notes 67, 87-91, 149-55 infra (discussion of literal analysis of securities transactions);
text accompanying notes 41-58, 69-86, 125-38, 156-72 infra (discussion of substantive analysis
of securities transactions); note 14 infra (status of alleged securities transaction often
depends on which jurisdiction decides issue).
" See text accompanying notes 67, 87-91, 108-16, 149-55 infra (literal approach to
definition of a security); text accompanying notes 41-58, 69-86, 125-38, 156-72 infra (substan-
tive approach to definition of a security).
' See text accompanying notes 67, 87-91, 108-16, 149-55 infra (literal application of
statutory definitions of a security).
S See text accompanying notes 41-58, 69-86, 125-38, 156-72 infra (substantive approach
to definition of a security).
14 Compare Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.
1969) (loan participation agreement is a security) with Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Com-
mercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174,1185 (6th Cir. 1981) (loan participation agreement not a security)
and Robbins v. First Am. Bank of Va., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,240 (N.D. Va. 1981) (loan participation not a security).
, See text accompanying notes 18-25 infra (penalties and civil liabilities for violation of
'33 and '34 Acts).
" See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.) (sale of entire
business is a security), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075, 1079-81 (7th Cir.) (promissory note is a security), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1969) (loan
participation is a security); Bartels v. Algonquin Properties, Ltd., 471 F.Supp. 1132, 1146-49
(D. Vt. 1979) (limited partnership interest in intended tax shelter is a security); SEC v. Paro,
468 F.Supp. 635, 643 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (co-op advertising arrangement in mail advertising
venture is a security); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943,
950 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (mortgage loan from savings and loan to real estate developer is a
security), affd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank
[1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) and [1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (loan participation is a security).
," See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (plaintiff
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negligence from recovery for common law fraud often try to use the '33
and '34 Acts' substantive" and procedural 9 advantages to impose liability
alleged interest in pension plan is a security); Hamblett v. Board of Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 472
F.Supp. 158, 166-67 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (plaintiff alleged savings account passbooks and similar
instruments issued by bank are securities); Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470
F.Supp. 780, 784-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff alleged business lease in shopping center is a
security); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 311, 319-20 (S.D. Ohio
1979) (allegation that discretionary trading account in commodity futures is a security);
Hendrickson v. Buchbinder, 465 F.Supp. 1250, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (allegation that bank
passbooks and similar documents are securities); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 463 F.Supp.
1149, 1151 (E.D. Va. 1979) (plaintiff alleged promissory notes connected with franchise
agreement are securities); note 16 supra (arms-length business transaction subject to
federal securities law); note 21 infra (securities laws are not remedies for loans gone awry).
"I See Note, Bank Loan Participations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts,
and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 265-67 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Bank Loan] (substantive advantages of federal securities laws include implied
private right of action, relaxed proof of fraud, reliance and causation, extended liability for
controlling persons, and possible attorney fees awards). Courts have implied a private right
of action under both the '33 Act and '34 Act. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (implied private right of action under § 10b of 1934 Act); 1
A. BROMBERT, SECURITIES LAW; FRAUD- SEC RULE 10B-5 § 2.4(1) (1967) (private right of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. See generally Simpson, Investors'
Civil Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (1961). The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the first court to imply a private right of action under
§ 10(b) of the '34 Act. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa.
1946). Although courts still recognize private actions under rule 10b-5, recent Supreme
Court decisions have limited the availability of rule 10b-5 actions. See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty without deception not actionable
fraud under rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (plaintiff in
private damage action under rule 10b-5 must make showing of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975) (private plaintiff under rule 10b-5 must be
purchaser or seller of security). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under The Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977); Note,
Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule 10b-5; An End To The Rule As Law, 1976 DUKE L.J.
789.
Congress based the federal securities laws' antifraud provisions on the common law
elements of fraud. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1978). To
recover in a common law fraud action, a plaintiff must prove an intentional misrepresenta-
tion, reliance, causation, and damages. See Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, 374; RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 551(1) (1938); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. At common law, a plaintiff had to prove that a
misrepresentation was made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly without
regard to its truthfulness. See PROSSER, supra, § 107. Although a plaintiff in a rule 10b-5 ac-
tion must make some showing of scienter to recover damages, the exact amount of proof re-
quired is uncertain. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (plaintiff must
make allegation of scienter to recover damages in 10b-5 action). But see SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (no scienter required for security fraud action),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
The Hochfelder Court defined scienter as the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
Id. at 194 n.12. The Court did not hold that a specific intent to deceive was necessary. Id.
The Court held, however, that "mere negligence" by a defendant would not permit a plain-
tiff to recover damages. Id.; see Note, Rule 10b-5 Liability after Hochfelder: Abandoning
the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 218, 231 (1977). The Hochfelder
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Court apparently precluded liability only for negligence and preserved common law
recklessness as proof of scienter in 10b-5 actions. See Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 471-74 (1977). See generally Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities And Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 Injunction Actions: A Reappraisal In Light Of Hochfelder, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 769 (1976); Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Note,
SEC Enforcement Actions To Enjoin Violations Of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The
Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977).
At common law, a person had no duty to voluntarily disclose material information
unless he occupied a fiduciary position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1976). Rule 10b-5 actions now mirror common law fraud actions and impose a duty to
disclose material information only when a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980). Furthermore, a mere breach of
fiduciary duty without deception or'manipulation is not actionable fraud under the federal
securities laws. Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977). Assuming, however,
that the disclosure and the intent or scienter requirements for common law fraud and a rule
10b-5 action are the same, a rule 10b-5 action is more attractive to a plaintiff because prov-
ing reliance and causation is easier in a rule 10b-5 action. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (proof of reliance and causation shifted to proof of
materiality of omitted or misleading information); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (plaintiff in rule 10b-5 action must prove that reasonable man would
attach importance to misleading information), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See
generally BROMBERG, supra, § 8.6 (reliance), § 8.7 (causation).
Corporate officers, members of the board of directors, parent corporations, majority
stockholders, and other controlling persons also may be liable for fraudulent activities
under the securities acts. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976); see Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-89 (2d
Cir. 1956) (partners in New York brokerage firm liable for California brokerage firm's rule
10b-5 violation); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F.Supp. 104, 109-10
(W.D. Ark. 1949) (brokerage firm liable for acts of wire correspondent). For a controlling
person to incur liability, the person controlled does not have to be a defendant. Demarco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1968). Although the '34 Act does not directly define "con-
trolling persons," the term clearly includes parent corporations, controlling stockholders,
and agents' principals. See Comment, Commercial Notes And Definition Of 'Security'
Under Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: A Note Is A Note Is A Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478,
506 n.116 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A Note Is A Note]; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1981) (SEC
rule 405(f) promulgated under '33 Act); ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 221 (Proposed Official
Draft, Mar. 15, 1978).
An additional advantage to suing under the '34 Act is the possibility of recovering at-
torney's fees. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (although not
expressly authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), successful party may recover attorney's fee
under '34 Act); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-71 (1975)
(Supreme Court overturned award of attorney's fees under Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1976), stating general rule that party in federal litigation cannot recover attorney's
costs).
"9 See Bank Loan, supra note 18, at 265-67 (federal securities laws provide for ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction, nationwide venue and service of process, and do not require a
plaintiff to post surety). The '33 and '34 Acts provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (transaction must involve
a security for federal jurisdiction under 1934 Act); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690, 691
(5th Cir. 1953) (transaction must involve a security for federal jurisdiction under '33 Act).
Since state law fraud statutes require different standards of proof, exclusive federal
jurisdiction provides a uniform standard of liability in all actions involving securities fraud.
Compare ALA. CODE § 6-5-101 (1975) (innocent misrepresentation is actionable fraud) with
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-6-2 (1981) (innocent misrepresentation is not actionable fraud). In addi-
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for unprofitable transactions on the nearest deep pocket.0 Congress,
however, did not enact the federal securities laws to provide a cause of
action for unhappy businessmen.
2 1
Congress enacted the '33 and '34 Acts in response to the
unscrupulous and abusive practices that caused the stock market crash
of 1929.22 Congress replaced caveat emptor with a philosophy of full
disclosure in order to achieve a high standard of professional ethics in
tion to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the '34 Act provides for nationwide venue and service
of process. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (venue and service or process relaxed under federal
securities statutes).
Plaintiffs suing under the federal securities acts do not have to post bonds for costs in
advance. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 830 (3d Cir.) (unlike stockholder
derivative actions in many states, no posting of bond for costs required in federal securities
action), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); cf. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
225 (8th Cir.) (bond required for expenses in state law cause of action), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (surety
bond required for expenses in state law cause of action if not waived by court). Some states,
however, require or allow a court to require a plaintiff in a stockholder derivative suit to
post security for court costs and a defendant's expenses, including attorney fees. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1981); A
Note Is A Note, supra note 18, at 507-08; cf. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 49 (1969)
(requiring indemnification bond). Although § 11(e) of the '33 Act requires security for ex-
penses, the provision need not apply if the plaintiff sues only under rule 10b-5 promulgated
under the '34 Act. See U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) (security for expenses provision of '33 Act).
20 See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1186 (6th Cir.
1981) (state fraud claim barred by contributory negligence so plaintiff alleged securities
laws violations); note 17 supra (plaintiffs alleged securities laws violations to take advantage
of uncertainty surrounding proper interpretation of definition of security).
"' See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1185 (6th
Cir. 1981) (securities laws are not panacea for commercial loans gone awry); Great W. Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (lawsuit over promissory note is just
another way to convert § 10(b) of '34 Act into source of general federal jurisdiction); accord,
Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112 (10th Cir. 1959) (securities laws not intended to apply
to all securities transactions because certain categories of transactions and securities ex-
cluded from laws' scope); Bangs, Rule lob-5 And The South Dakota Lawyer, 14 S.D. L. REV.
56, 79 (1969) (rule 10b-5 is becoming most prolific source of litigation since Henry Ford in-
vented the automobile); text accompanying notes 22-27 infra (congressional policy of federal
securities laws).
I See, e.g., United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); SENATE COMMIT-
TEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 81 (1934) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 14551; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess.; L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 74-76 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 214, 214-19 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Loomis]; Newton, supra note 3, at 168.
The stock market crash of October 1929 abruptly ended an era of seemingly indefinite
prosperity that followed World War I. Loss, supra, at 75. Investors in the United States
bought over $50 billion of securities from 1920 to 1933. Id. Over one-half of these securities
were worthless by 1933. Id. The aggregate value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange was $89 billion on September 1, 1929. Id. By the end of October 1929, the ag-
gregate value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange had fallen to $71 billion,
a decrease of over $18 billion. Id. In 1932, the aggregate figure was only $15 billion. Id. In
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the securities markets.' The acts attempt to protect the investing public
from fraud and nondisclosure of relevant information24 by providing
penalties and remedies for fraudulent practices connected with the sale
or purchase of a security.' Although the acts provide broad remedies for
just two and one-half years, the aggregate value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange dropped by over $74 billion, or over 83 percent. Id.
Several factors prompted the crash. The primary factor was the extensive use of credit
for speculation on small margins and the resulting mass sale of securities to meet margin
calls on any decline in the market. Loomis, supra, at 217. Another factor was the manipula-
tion of prices on the exchanges by pools of issuers and their management involved in short-
term trading on inside information. Id. The failure of corporations listed on the exchanges to
disclose material information to investors aggravated other defects in the operation of the
market and greatly contributed to the crash by flooding the market with worthless and
near-worthless securities. Id.; S. REP. No. 1455 supra.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 188-90 (1963). President
Roosevelt's 1933 message to Congress concerning new securities legislation states that the
proposed securities laws add to the ancient rule let the buyer beware, the further doctrine
let the seller also beware. See H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
(J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973), Item 15, at 1.
24 See, e.g., United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); SEC v. Sunbeam
Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1938); SEC v. Gulf International Finance Corp.,
223 F.Supp. 987, 989 (C.D. Fla. 1963); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 18 (1934); S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). See
also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (information is relevant if
substantial likelihood exists that reasonable shareholder would consider information import-
ant in making investment decision).
The '33 Act seeks to protect investors from losses incurred as a result of buying worth-
less securities by requiring issuers to disclose all relevant information concerning a new offer-
ing prior to sale. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h, 77j (1976). The '34 Act requires full disclosure of
relevant information concerning any subsequent sales of securities in secondary markets.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771-78n (1976).
The '33 Act imposes liability only for fraud on the part of sellers. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1976); see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (civil liability on.persons involved in preparing registra-
tion statement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1976) (liability on any person in the offer or sale of
any security). The '34 Act, and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, however, impose liability
on both buyers and sellers of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
Therefore, when an issuer sues a buyer for fraud, the action is exclusively under the 1934
Act. See A Note Is A Note, supra note 18, at 479 n.4.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) (antifraud provision of '33 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)
(antifraud provision of the '34 Act). Section 17(a) of the '33 Act makes unlawful any device,
scheme, practice, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money by means of*an untrue statement
or omission of a material fact in connection with the offer or sale of a security. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1976). Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
§ lb of the '34 Act, contains proscriptions almost identical to the prohibitions in § 17(a) of
the '33 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (§ 10(b) of the '34 Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981)
(rule 10b-5); note 24 supra ('33 Act disclosure requirements apply to new offerings of
securities while '34 Act disclosure requirements apply to secondary trading).
Under both the '33 Act and the '34 Act, no federal subject matter jurisdiction exists if
there is not a sale or purchase of a security. See National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All
Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978). The '33 Act defines a "sale" as
every contract for sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security for value. See 15
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defrauded parties in securities transactions,"6 the acts do not apply to
every financial transaction.27
The '33 and '34 Acts govern a transaction only if two requirements
exist. 8 First, the transaction must involve interstate commerce or use of
the United States mail. 9 Second, the transaction must involve a
security." Since most business transactions involve some form of in-
terstate commerce or use of the mails,3 and because the parties to a
transaction cannot waive compliance with the provisions of the
securities acts,32 the presence of a security in a transaction often deter-
U.S.C. §.77(b)(3) (1976). The definition of a sale in the '34 Act functionally is equivalent to the
definition of a sale in the '33 Act. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41
(7th Cir. 1979); National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d at
1298; 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(14) (1976) ('34 Act definition of sale). Although the '33 Act does not
define "purchase," under the '34 Act, a purchase includes any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(13) (1976). See 604 F.2d at 1040 (no definition
of "purchase" in 1933 Act); Note, Rubin v. United States: Pledge of Stock as Collateral for a
Commercial Loan is a "Sale" of a Security, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 863 n.4, 864 n.5
(1981) (discussion of definition of sale and purchase under '33 and '34 Acts and alternatives
for plaintiffs if no sale or purchase exists). See generally Comment, The Pledge And The
Purchase And Sale Requirement Of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5, 65 GEO. L.J. 1593 (1977).
" See notes 18 & 19 supra (federal securities laws provide expansive easily obtained
remedies for defrauded parties in securities transactions).
" See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra (jurisdictional requirements under '33
and '34 Acts); note 17 supra (transactions not governed by federal securities laws).
' See text accompanying notes 29-30 infra.
' See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The United States Constitution expressly limits Con-
gress' power over domestic commerce to interstate commerce. Id. The Constitution,
therefore, impliedly limits all federal regulations concerning domestic commerce to in-
terstate commerce. See id.
' See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1981); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F.Supp. 334, 334-35 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.Supp. 445, 447 (D. Colo. 1978). See also Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-17 (5th Cir.) (discussion of federal jurisdiction in securities cases),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
'I See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (local high interest loans
subject to federal law); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (local restaurant
subject to federal law because it purchased meat from a local supplier who purchased meat
outside state); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1942) (farmer growing wheat for
personal consumption subject to federal law); Western Waste Service Systems v. Universal
Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.) (hauling rubbish locally substantially affects in-
terstate commerce), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Cent-
ury Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1979) (unlawful tying arrangement subject
to federal regulation); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48, 53-55
(3d Cir. 1973) (local boycott to limit competition subject to federal law).
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976) ('34 Act antiwaiver provision); 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976)
('33 Act antiwaiver provision). In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court voided an agreement
to arbitrate future disputes between a brokerage house and its customers under the an-
tiwaiver provision of the '33 Act. 346 U.S. 427, 432-35 (1953); see Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182-83 (2d Cir.) (very likely that antiwaiver provision of 1934 Act




mines whether the acts apply. With the relative ease of recovery under
the acts,3 the type of analysis a court applies to determine if a transac-
tion involves a security often determines whether a plaintiff can recover
damages at all."
I. INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
Both the '33 Act and the '34 Act define a security by listing in-
struments commonly considered securities., Congress included generic
terms such as "investment contract" in the statutory definitions to in-
sure that the acts governed all instruments with the characteristics of
securities. Language preceding the statutory definitions, however,
states that an instrument is a security unless the context requires other-
wise. 7 The securities acts, therefore, may not apply if the parties to a
transaction did not use an instrument in the normal context of a
securities transaction, even though the parties to the transaction labeled
the instrument as a security, or the instrument commonly is known as a
security.' Although some courts ignore the language, preceding the
statutory definitions and hold that an instrument is a security simply by
finding the instrument's label listed in the statutory definition," most
courts reject this literal approach and examine the circumstances sur-
rounding an alleged securities transaction to determine if the securities
acts apply.
40
' See A Note Is A Note, supra note 18, at 504-06 (comparative ease of recovery under
rule 10b-5); text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra (requirements for recovery under 10b-5).
3 See Bank Loan, supra note 18, at 266-67 (classification of security might determine if
plaintiff recovers at all).
See notes 1 & 2 supra ('33 and '34 Acts' definition of a security).
See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (security defined in sufficiently
broad and general terms so as to include instruments known as securities); Long, An At-
tempt To Return "Investment Contracts" To The Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 135, 138 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Long] (investment contract definition pro-
tects investors from schemes with the characteristics of a security); notes 1 & 2 supra
(statutory definitions of a security).
See notes 1 & 2 supra (precatory language to statutory definitions).
See note 40 infra (substantive analysis of alleged securities transaction). See also
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-57 (1975) (substantive analysis
adopted by Supreme Court for examining alleged securities transactions).
See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1180 n.7 (6th
Cir. 19 81) (discussion of literal approach to definition of a security); Exchange Nat'l Bank of
Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (literal approach applied
to notes); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1969)
(literal approach applied to loan participation).
0 See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,851 (1975) (instruments labeled
"stock" by parties to transaction not securities); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp.
454, 468 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (notes not securities), aff'd, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 307, 313 (E.D.
Mo. 1971) (notes not securities); accord, Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit,
651 F.2d 1174, 1180 (6th Cir. 1981) (literal inclusion of instrument in statutory definition is
not dispositive of finding a security). But see Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank,
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In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,' the Supreme Court adopted a substance-
over-form analysis for examining an alleged securities transaction. In
Howey, the Court held that sales contracts for plots of farm land and ser-
vice contracts to harvest fruit trees on the land were securities under
the federal securities laws. 2 The Court examined the circumstances or
"economic realities" of the transaction to determine if the sales and ser-
vice contracts were investment contracts within the statutory definition
of a security."3 The Howey Court held that an investment contract is any
contract, transaction, or scheme in which a person invests money in a
common enterprise and expects profits solely from the work of a third
party." The Court held that the sales and service contracts were invest-
ment contracts under the '33 Act because the promoters of the land at-
tracted buyers solely by the chance of a return on the buyer's invest-
ment, and the buyers did not intend to occupy or develop the land
themselves."
409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1969) (literal approach to definition of security applied to loan par-
ticipation).
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In addition to SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court has
decided several other cases dealing with the definition of a security. See note 4 supra
(Supreme Court decisions concerning definition of a security).
" 328 U.S. at 301. In Howey, the Howey Company offered for sale to the public long
strips of land that contained rows of citrus trees. Id. at 295. The company encouraged
buyers to enter into ten year service contracts with the company to cultivate and harvest
the buyer's trees. Id. at 296. The company told purchasers that the service contracts were
not absolutely required, but that it was not feasible to profitably invest in the land without
the service contracts. Id. at 295. Once a buyer signed a service contract, he had no right to
specific fruit and received only a portion of the profits derived from the sale of fruit
harvested from his plot. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945),
rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
" 328 U.S. at 298. Although a person usually does not characterize the sale of land in
conjunction with a service contract to harvest fruit on the land as a security transaction, the
Howey Court found that such a transaction clearly was an investment contract because
"something more" than a transfer of ownership in land was involved. Id. at 299. The Court
held that the management and harvesting of the land was the primary value of the invest-
ment. Id. at 300.
" Id. at 298-99. The Howey Court primarily relied on State v. Golpher Tire & Rubber
Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), in defining an investment contract. See 328 U.S. at
298. In Golpher Tire, the court defined "investment" for purposes of the definition of "in-
vestment contract" in the state's securities laws as the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment. 177 N.W. at 938;
see FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 899 n.18.
," 328 U.S. at 300. The Howey Court concluded that because the elements of an invest-
ment contract existed, the sales and service contracts were securities within the statutory
definition of a security in the '33 Act and, thus, the provisions of the '33 Act applied to the
transaction. Id. Despite a wide following in lower courts, the Howey test became unpopular
with many commentators. See Long, supra note 36, at 177 (Howey is "tragic"); cf. Tew &
Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of
the Economic Relationship between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser,
27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 407, 448 (1973) (commenting with regret that criticism of Howey is
mark of progressive thought). See also FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 899 n.20 (discussion of
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Although the Howey Court defined only an investment contract,46 in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman," the Court stated that the
Howey economic realities test embodies the essential attributes of all
the Court's decisions defining a security.48 In Forman, the Court applied
the economic realities test to stock certificates that entitled a purchaser
to live in publicly financed, low-income housing.49 The Court held that the
federal securities laws did not govern the instruments even though the
parties to the transaction labeled the instruments "stock."5 The Court
noted that the instruments possessed none of the traditional
characteristics associated with stock. 1 The instruments were not
negotiable, could not be pledged or encumbered, conferred no voting
rights, paid no dividends, and most importantly, could not realize a profit
by increasing in value.2
The Forman Court stated that a court should examine the actual
economic inducement of the parties and the underlying purpose of a
subsequent history of Howey test). Courts, however, have applied the Howey test to a
variety of instruments. See, e.g., McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1975)
WI-owey test applied to interests in real property); Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C. H.
Wagner & Co., 405 F.Supp. 385, 388-89 (D. Mass. 1975) (Howey test applied to interests in oil
and gas leases); accord, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. LTV Corp., 479 F.Supp. 1279, 1283-86 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (analysis of extent that Howey test applies to other instruments).
" See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (economic realities test
defines investment contract); FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 899 n.20 (Howey Court was not
defining security in general, but rather investment contract).
17 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
" Id. at 852. The Forman Court reaffirmed the Howey test's substance over form
analysis and found no distinction between an "investment contract" and an "instrument
commonly known as a security." Id.; see notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security).
" 421 U.S. at 860. In Forman, 57 residents of Co-op City brought a class action suit on
behalf of 15,000 apartment owners in the same complex. Id. at 844. The plaintiffs sought
over $30 million in damages and forced rental reductions. Id. A cooperative agreement re-
quired tenants to purchase 18 shares of "stock" for every room leased and to pay a small
rental charge. Id. at 842-43. Originally, the defendants told the plaintiffs that the rental
charge was $23.02 per room; however, the charge increased to $39.68 per room. Id. at 843.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew that the rental charges would increase and failed
to disclose the increase to residents. Id. at 844; 844 n.8.
Io Id. at 848. The Forman Court stated that there was no clear indication why the par-
ties labeled the instruments "stock." Id. at 848 n.13. The Court assumed that the parties used
the term "stock" simply as a matter of tradition and convenience. Id. The Forman Court
warned, however, that although the name given to an instrument is not dispositive of find-
ing a security, the name is not wholly irrelevant in deciding whether an instrument is a
security. Id. at 850. The Court explained that occasions exist when the use of a traditional
name such as "stock" or "bonds" might lead a person to justifiably assume that the federal
securities laws apply to a transaction, especially when the transaction embodies some of the
significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument. Id. at 850-51; see
Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.Supp. 925, 926-27 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (federal securities laws
govern issuance of stock to executive personnel of issuer irrespective of fact that transac-
tion fails Howey test because personnel do not rely solely on efforts of others for profit).
421 U.S. at 851.
'Id.
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transaction to determine if a transaction involves a security. 3 The Court
held that profits under the economic realities test require either capital
appreciation resulting from the development of an initial investment or
a participation in earnings resulting from the use of an investor's funds. 4
The Court also held that the "efforts of others" requirement of the
economic realities test requires that an investor receive financial return
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.5 Since the pur-
chasers of the stock certificates in Forman bought the stock solely to ac-
quire low cost housing and did not expect profits from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others, 6 the Court held that the
federal securities laws did not govern the stock certificates. 7
The Forman Court's application of the Howey economic realities test
demonstrates that the Court prefers a substantive analysis for deter-
Id. at 851. The Supreme Court in Forman reversed the Second Circuit's literal ap-
proach to the definition of a security. See Forman v. Community Servs., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252
(2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The
Second Circuit held that the mere use of the term "stock" in a financial transaction trig-
gered the protections of the federal securities laws. 500 F.2d at 1252; see SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (instrument may be a security if it conforms to
name or description of a security).
" 421 U.S. at 852.
Id. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (earnings resulting from use of
investors' funds found in dividends on savings and loan association's profits); SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 356 (1943) (capital appreciation resulting from develop-
ment of initial investment includes sale of oil leases conditioned on promoter's agreement to
drill exploratory well).
' 421 U.S. at 855-56. The Forman Court explained that the tenants could not sell the
stock at a profit because when a tenant moved, the Co-op had the option to repurchase the
tenant's stock at the original selling price. Id. at 842.
" Id. at 858. Four years after Forman, the Supreme Court in International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), applied the Howey economic realities test to an in-
terest in a noncontributory compulsory pension fund. Id. at 570. The Teamsters' Union Pen-
sion Fund consisted of contributions made by union employers. Id. at 552-53. Union
members generally could not make individual contributions and could not withdraw from
the plan. Id. at 553. When an eligible union member retired he received a fixed pension com-
puted according to a standard formula. Id. at 561. The Daniel Court examined the economic
realities of the pension plan and held that the plan was not an investment contract for pur-
poses of the federal securities laws. Id. at 570.
The Daniel Court held that an employee's participation in a noncontributory com-
pulsory pension plan does not comport with the commonly held understanding of an invest-
ment contract. Id. at 559. The Court determined that an employee sells his labor primarily
to obtain a livelihood, not to make an investment. Id. at 560. The Court explained that when
an employer's obligation to a pension fund depends on overall man-weeks of labor and not on
a particular employee's labor, the employer's contributions to a pension fund do not con-
stitute an investment for a particular employee. Id. at 560-61. The Court therefore held that
an individual employee does not make an investment of money in a compulsory noncon-
tributory pension plan sufficient to satisfy the Howey economic realities test. Id. at 561, 570.
The Court also held that the pension fund was not a security because even though the fund
depended to some extent on earnings from investments made by the fund's trustees, the
largest portion of the fund's income came from employer contributions. Id. at 561-62. Since
an employee's expectation of a pension did not depend on an expectation of profits from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of the fund's trustees, the Court held that the pension
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mining whether a transaction involves a security.,8 Although most
courts follow the Supreme Court's lead and apply a substantive analysis
to determine whether a transaction involves a security,59 many courts
continue to ignore the circumstances surrounding a transaction and
mechanically apply the literal language in the statutory definition of a
security.6 Recent court decisions concerning the status of promissory
notes, ' loan participations, 2 and the sale of stock in close corporations63
fund did not satisfy the "efforts of others" requirement of the Howey test. Id.
', 421 U.S. at 858. The Forman Court stressed that form should be disregarded for sub-
stance when defining the meaning and scope of the word security, and the emphasis should
be on the economic realities of the transaction. Id. at 848 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). The Court stated that an item may be within the letter of a statute and
yet not within the statute because not within the spirit or intention of the statute. 421 U.S.
at 849 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); see SEC
v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (legislative policy of federal securities
law demands analysis of context of transaction not form of instrument).
After Forman, the Howey economic realities test defines a security as an investment of
money in a common venture on an expectation of either capital appreciation resulting from
the development of an investor's initial investment, or a participation in earnings resulting
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. See 421 U.S. at 852. In Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, the Supreme Court held that an employee's labor is
not an investment of money sufficient to satisfy the Howey test. 439 U.S. at 551, 570.
Although the Daniel Court implied that a direct transfer of money was not necessary to
satisfy the Howey test, after Daniel serious doubts about the presence of a security must
arise when a court cannot find a divisible portion of the consideration attributable to the ac-
quisition of an alleged security. See FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 905.
The Forman Court did not include the word "solely" in the third prong of the Howey
test. See 421 U.S. at 852. Although the Court stated that the "efforts of others" require-
ment of the Howey test meant "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts," the Court apparent-
ly retreated from the "solely" requirement of Howey. See FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 906.
Even before Forman, lower courts had held instruments to be securities where the investor
assisted in producing profits. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483
(5th Cir. 1974) (pyramid marketing scheme where investor's profits partly derived from own
efforts is a security); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.)
(critical inquiry is whether efforts of persons beside investor are the undeniably significant
efforts that affect the failure or success of the venture), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See
also FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 906 (Forman's amendment of Howey test's "efforts of
others" requirement to "largely from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others"
opens questions of definition of "largely").
" See text accompanying notes 69-86, 125-38, 156-72 infra (substantive interpretation
of definition of a security).
See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38
(2d Cir. 1976) (Forman is of dubious value and best course is to follow literal language of
statutes); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 549 (10th Cir. 1974) (literal language of statutory
definition of security followed); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522
(5th Cir. 1974) (literal approach used); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-81
(7th Cir. 1972) (literal definition of security applied); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, 452
F.2d 662, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (strict reading of statute).
" See text accompanying notes 66-104 infra (discussion of promissory notes as
securities).
612 See text accompanying notes 101-42 infra (discussion of loan participations as
securities).
I See text accompanying notes 142-72 infra (discussion of stock in close corporations
as securities).
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exemplify the dichotomy between the literal 4 and substantive65 inter-
pretations of the definition of a security.
II. PROMISSORY NOTES
The definition of a security in both the '33 Act and the '34 Act pro-
vides that unless the context requires otherwise, any "note" or "par-
ticipation" in any note is a security." Although early decisions held that
notes were securities by applying the statutory definitions strictly,67 ap-
plication of a substantive analysis led many courts to look beyond the
literal language of the statutory definitions. 8 For example, in Lino v. City
Investing Co., 9 the Third Circuit recognized that the literal language in
the statutory definitions included notes as securities." The court held,
however, that notes given in payment to operate a business franchise
were not securities under the federal securities laws." The Lino court
stated that Congress specifically instructed courts, through the
language preceding the statutory definitions, that some instruments
were within the letter of the statute, but were not within the spirit of
the law." The court concluded that the commercial context of the alleged
security transaction and the absence of characteristics generally
associated with a security, demonstrated that the notes in question were
not securities under the federal securities laws. 3
The Lino court determined that promissory notes used in a commer-
cial context were not securities, while promissory notes used in an in-
vestment context were securities." The court examined the securities
statutes and the statutes' legislative histories and stated that no ex-
press reference to consumer or commercial transactions existed. 5 The
"' See text accompanying notes 87-90, 108-17, 149-55 infra (literal approach to defini-
tion of a security).
" See text accompanying notes 41-57 supra; text accompanying notes 69-86, 125-38,
156-72 infra (substantive approach to definition of a security).
See notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security in '33 and '34 Acts).
"7 See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 1972);
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1132 (2d Cir. 1976) (promissory notes presumed
not securities).
" See text accompanying notes 69-86 infra (substantive approach applied to promis-
sory notes).
487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
70 Id. at 691.
7' Id. at 694-95.
71 Id. at 695; see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892) (item
may be within statute but not within spirit of law). See also SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (courts should construe details of statute in conformity
with statute's dominating purpose).
7 487 F.2d at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
7 Id.; see Note, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L.
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court concluded that since the issuer of the notes was a private party
and did not offer the notes for sale to the public, did not procure the
notes for speculation or investment, and did not use the notes to solicit
capital, the entire transaction was commercial in nature and, therefore,
the federal securities laws did not govern the transaction."6
Other courts have adopted tests similar to the Third Circuit's com-
mercial/investment distinction in analyzing whether promissory notes
are securities." In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,"8 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a corporate note given to a bank in exchange for a
renewable line of credit was not a security." The court stated that a note
given to a bank in the course of a commercial financing transaction
presumably is not a security under the federal securities acts." The
court held that a security exists only when a lender subjects "risk
capital" to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of a borrower.'
Although the Great Western court did not expressly define risk
capital,"2 the court explained that the essential difference between a risk
REv. 362, 381-83, 397-98 (1972) (legislative history concerning notes as securities is sparse);
notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security in '33 and '34 Acts).
78 487 F.2d at 694-95. Before Lino, other federal courts previously had held notes and
loans not securities. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F.Supp. 592, 608 (W.D.
Ark. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F.Supp. 3, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970). The Lino court, however, was the first court to directly
use the precatory language to the statutory definitions of a security to exclude promissory
notes from federal regulation. See 487 F.2d at 695. Lino apparently made a substantial im-
pact on the commentators' views of promissory notes as securities. Compare Lipton & Katz,
"Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities, 29 Bus. LAW. 861, 863-69 (1974) (promissory
notes are securities) with Lipton & Katz, "Notes "Are NotAlways Securities, 30 Bus. LAW.
763, 765-772 (1975) (promissory notes are not securities).
" See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d
490, 492 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d
1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1974).
The statutory definition in the '34 Act expressly excludes notes with a maturity of less
than nine months. See note 2 supra (statutory definition of a security in '34 Act); Bellah v.
First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d at 1114 ('34 Act's nine month maturity exclusion applied to short-
term commercial notes). Although the '33 Act does not exempt short-term notes, apparently
a note between a private borrower and a single bank would be exempted under the '33 Act's
private offerings exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1976) (Securities Act of 1933 private of-
ferings exemption); accord, Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126,
1131-33 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussion of short-term commercial paper under '33 and '34 Acts).
78 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 1253. The Great Western court stated that the plaintiff's case was merely




' See id. The Great Western court recognized that all loans involve some risk of
default. Id. at 1259. The court explained, however, that a risky loan involves only a high
possibility of default while risk capital involves a direct relationship between a lender's risk
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capital contribution and a commercial transaction is the amount of risk
involved.13 The court concluded that the amount of risk involved in a
transaction depends upon the length of time the money is on loan, the
amount of collateralization, the form of the obligation, the circumstances
surrounding the transaction, the relationship between the amount bor-
rowed and the size of the borrower's business, and the contemplated use
of the loan proceeds.84 The court held that the note in question was not
risk capital subject to a borrower's managerial efforts because the loan
agreement placed extensive restrictions on the borrower's use of loan
proceeds and the conduct of the borrower's business operations." Since
the notes involved no risk capital, the court concluded that the notes
were not securities.
8
Three months after Great Western, the Second Circuit criticized the
commercial/investment distinction and risk capital analysis of promis-
sory notes in Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.87 The Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that a presumption that promissory notes are
securities more closely adheres to the language of the statutory defini-
tions than does the Great Western presumption that promissory notes
are not securities.88 The Exchange National court, therefore, applied the
literal language of the statutory definitions and held that the federal
securities laws governed promissory notes that were part of a large
financing operation conducted by a brokerage firm." The court recognized
in dictum, however, limited situations when a promissory note may not
be a security.
of default and a borrower's managerial efforts. Id. at 1259-60. See also United Cal. Bank v.
THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977) (notes evidencing risk of nonpayment are
securities while notes evidencing risky loans are not securities).
532 F.2d at 1257.
88 Id. at 1257-58.
85 Id. at 1259-60. The Great Western court concluded that the note was a commercial
transaction subject to the risks normally associated with commercial loans. Id.
Id. at 1260.
544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1138. The Exchange National court stated that efforts to define a security
under the commercial/investment distinction carry little promise of success. Id. at 1136. The
court criticized the Howey economic realities test because the test seems of "dubious value"
when applied to promissory notes. Id.; see text accompanying notes 41-46 supra (Iowey
economic realities test).
89 544 F.2d at 1138. Since the notes in Exchange National were part of a large financ-
ing operation conducted by a brokerage firm and both parties knew that the state stock ex-
change would consider the proceeds of the notes equivalent to equity capital, the notes
would probably have been securities even under a commercial/investment or risk capital ap-
proach. See id. at 1128-29; McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1974)
(investment notes indicated if notes offered to class of investors, acquired for speculation, or
acquired as investment assets), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); text accompanying notes
69-86 supra (discussion of commercial/investment test and risk capital test).
544 F.2d at 1138-39. The Exchange National court stated that consumer financing
notes, mortgage notes on a home, short-term notes secured by a lien on a small business or
its assets, notes evidencing "character" loans to a bank customer, short-term notes secured
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Although dictum, the Exchange National court's recognition that
some promissory notes are not securities demonstrates that even in the
Second Circuit, the last stronghold of the literal approach,9 1 courts
recognize that promissory notes are not always securities.2 Courts after
Exchange National, however, have not adopted the Second Circuit's
presumption that promissory notes are securities. 3 Instead, courts have
examined the circumstances surrounding a transaction involving a
promissory note to determine if a security exist. 4 For example, in
Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc.,5 the District of Columbia Circuit refused
to apply a literal analysis to promissory notes and examined the cir-
cumstances surrounding the notes in question to determine if the
securities acts governed the transaction.
In Baurer, the plaintiff delivered a check to the defendants for
$15,000.11 In exchange for the check, the defendants issued a promissory
note to the plaintiff for the same amount." The note expressly stated
that plaintiff's loan was in lieu of a capital contribution to a limited part-
nership being organized by the defendants.9 The Baurer court held that
the securities laws govern only investment transactions and applied the
Howey economic realities test to the defendants' promissory note to
determine if the note was commercial or investment in nature.'9
The Baurer court determined that the parties intended the note to
by an assignment of accounts receivables, and notes formalizing an open-account debt incur-
red in the ordinary course of business usually are not securities. Id. When a note does not
bear a strong "family resemblance" to these examples, the court held that the federal
securities laws applied. Id.; see United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850-51
(1975) (name given instrument might lead person justifiably to assume federal securities
laws apply to transaction); note 58 supra (discussion of Forman Court's analysis of label
given to instrument).
" See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1180 n.7 (6th
Cir. 1981) (literalism discredited everywhere except for "new literalism" of Second Circuit).
92 See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied; 102 S. Ct.
396 (1981); Baurer v. Planning Group, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,365 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Amfac Manuf. Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 433
(9th Cir. 1978); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 529 F.Supp. 258, 261 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
" See note 92 supra (substantive analysis applied in recent decisions concerning promis-
sory notes).
" See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
396 (1981); Baurer v. Planning Group, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,365 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Amfac Manuf. Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 433
(9th Cir. 1978); Great W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258-60 (9th Cir. 1976);
C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Manuf. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973).
' [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,362 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 92, 231-32.
Id. at 92, 227-29.
"Id.
'Id.
100 Id. at 92, 229-32.
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be an investment. 1 ' The court held that the language of the note
demonstrated that the defendants induced the plaintiff to advance
money by a promise of an investment opportunity."2 The plaintiff ad-
vanced money in reliance on the defendants' representations of their en-
trepreneurial and managerial skills for successfully forming and
operating a profitable partnership."3 Since the note in question
represented an investment in a common venture premised on an expec-
tation of profits derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of another, the Baurer court held that the note was a security governed
by the securities acts.'
III. LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
Baurer and other decisions examining whether promissory notes are
securities provide guidance for courts determining whether loan par-
ticipations are securities because promissory notes form an integral part
of loan participations.' A loan participation is a transaction in which a
lead bank or similar financial institution sells to one or more par-
ticipating banks or financial institutions an undivided, fractional interest
in a promissory note and any collateral securing the note.' 8 Similar to
courts examining whether promissory notes are securities, courts ex-
amining whether loan participations are securities apply both literal and
substantive approaches.' For example, the Fifth Circuit in Lehigh
I Id. at 92, 232.
102 Id.
103 Id.
04 Id. Although the Baurer court did not expressly determine that the proposed part-
nership was a common venture under the Howey economic realities test, the court deter-
mined that the parties were jointly responsible for the partnership's success and therefore,
the partnership clearly was a common venture. See id.
See Bank Loan, supra note 18, at 262-65.
" See id. at 262-64 (explanation of loan participation). Although a loan participation
does not have to involve a financial institution, an overwhelming majority of participations
involve banks and finance companies. See id.
In a typical loan participation, the participating bank often has no direct legal or per-
sonal relationship with the borrower. See id. at 262-63, 262 n.11. The lead bank issues a par-
ticipation agreement that regulates the participating bank's rights to payments of principal
and interest and to any loan collateral. See id. at 263. A loan participation therefore is
distinguishable from a multi-bank or syndicate loan in which each bank loans money directly
to a borrower and an agent bank merely administers or moderates the loan. Id. at 263 n.12.
Participations allow a bank to fulfill the needs of a client when a bank could not otherwise
do so because of either insufficient reserves or lending ceilings. See id. at 263-65; Lehigh
Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1969) (state law precluded
lead bank from extending more credit to customer). Participations also help spread the risk
associated with a loan because just as the lead bank and the participants receive a pro rata
share of interest and principal repayments, they also share pro rata in any loss if default oc-
curs. See Bank Loan, supra note 18, at 265.
" See note 138 infra (cases using literal and substantive approaches).
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Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank"'8 applied a literal analysis to
determine if a loan participation was a security under the federal
securities laws."9 In Lehigh Valley, Central National Bank offered a por-
tion of a loan for participation to Lehigh Valley Trust Company."1 After
the loan was in default, Lehigh Valley filed a rule 10b-5 action alleging
that Central failed to disclose that the loan was a significant risk.'
The Lehigh Valley court examined the statutory definition of a
security and determined that the participation was a security under
federal law."2 The court noted that the statutory definition included any
"note" and that the Supreme Court has construed the antifraud provis-
ions of the federal securities laws expansively."' The court also noted
that the statutory definition of a security included any certificate of in-
terest or participation in a note."4 The Lehigh Valley court concluded
that it must read the statute literally"5 and, therefore, held that the par-
ticipation was a certificate of interest on a note covered by the federal
securities laws."6
Although commentators criticized Lehigh Valley for not examining
the language preceding the statutory definitions 1 7 and for not examining
the exemptions of certain notes in the statutory definitions,"8 the decis-
ion demonstrates that a loan participation can be a security under the
federal securities laws, especially when the note underlying the par-
ticipation is a security."9 Determining that a note involved in a loan par-
' 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
' Id. at 991.
1D Id.
... Id. at 991-92. The loan in Lehigh Valley was a significant risk because the corpora-
tion whose stock collateralized the loan had filed for reorganization under the Bankruptcy
Act. Id. at 990-91. Lehigh Valley was not told about the reorganization petition and also was
not told that a prime guarantor of the loan was already in default to Central National on
personal obligations, that other banks were already foreclosing on collateral for other loans,
and that bank examiners had criticized other loans made to the borrowers. Id.
..' Id. at 992.
"I Id. at 992-93; see notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security). Apparently
the Lehigh Valley court followed the policy of broadly construing the remedies of the
federal securities laws in order to deter fraud in the market. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 455 (1969); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
409 F.2d at 993.
"' Id.; see note 113 supra.
"' Id. at 995.
See Epstein, Bank Participation Agreements as Securities, 87 BANKING L.J. 99,
102-03 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Epstein] (Lehigh Valley court should have considered
precatory language to statutory definition); Bank Loan, supra note 18, at 271 n.54.
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976) ('34 Act's statutory definition excludes any note that
has a maturity at time of issuance of less than nine months); 15 U.S.C. §. 77c(a)(3) (1976)
(similar exemption found in '33 Act); notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security).
"9 See, e.g., Avenue State Bank v. Tourlet, 379 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (dic-
tum); Crowell v, Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co., 373 F.Supp. 1303, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See
generally Epstein, supra note 117.
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ticipation is not a security, however, does not determine necessarily that
a loan participation itself is not a security. If a court decides that a loan
participation itself is an investment contract, the status of notes
underlying the participation becomes irrelevant because an investment
contract is a security under both the '33 and '34 Acts.120 Courts examin-
ing participations as investment contracts, however, rely heavily on the
type of loan underlying the participation.' 21 Many courts thus apply a
type of hybrid analysis consisting of a combination of the Howey
economic realities test' 22 and the risk capital or commercial/investment
analysis'23 to examine loan participations alleged to be securities.' 4
In Union Planters National Bank v. Commercial Credit,2' the Sixth
Circuit applied a combination of the Howey economic realities test and
the risk capital test to determine if a loan participation agreement was a
security under the '34 Act. 2 6 The Union Planters court applied a risk
capital analysis to determine if the participation satisfied the "invest-
ment of money" requirement of the Howey economic realities test."
Although the court recognized that in one sense, every lender of money
is an investor because he places his money at risk in anticipation of pro-
fit in the form of interest,2 1 the court rejected this analysis and held that
the participation was not an investment under the Howey test." Since
repayment of the underlying loan began almost immediately and the bor-
rower's accounts receivable collateralized the loan, the court concluded
that under the Great Western risk capital analysis, 3' the loan merely
was a commercial transaction and not an investment.
3 '
The Union Planters Bank court also concluded that the participation
failed the "expectation of profits" and the "efforts of others" re-
quirements of the Howey test.32 The court held that periodic interest
payments received under the participation agreement were not capital
" See notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security); Bank Loan, supra note 18,
at 281-86 (discussion of loan participations as investment contracts).
,'' See, e.g., Robbins v. First Am. Bank of Va., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,240 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d
1174, 1185 (6th Cir. 1981).
'" See text accompanying notes 41-57 supra (discussion of the Howey economic
realities test).
" See text accompanying notes 69-86 supra (discussion of the commerciallinvestment
and risk capital tests).
"'1 See notes 125-38, infra (cases using hybrid test for a security).
'2 651 F.2d 1174 (1981).
"3 Id. at 1180-85.
"3 Id. at 1181-83.
"3 Id. at 1181.
"3 Id. at 1181-83.
"3 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 78-86 supra (discus-
sion of risk capital analysis).
,3' 651 F.2d at 1181-82.
,' Id. at 1184-85.
[vol. 39:11231142
DEFINING A SECURITY
appreciation resulting from an initial investment, or a participation in
earnings, and therefore not profits.133 Since the interest payments were
not profits, Union Planters Bank could not have an expectation of receiv-
ing profits. 34 Although the court recognized that Commercial Credit
supervised the repayment of the loan,"3 ' the court concluded that Com-
mercial Credit's efforts were not managerial or entrepreneurial as re-
quired by the Howey test.36 Commercial Credit's responsibilities were
merely routine loan monitoring tasks that generated no expectation of
profits.'37 Since the participation failed the "investment of money," the
"expectation of profits," and the "efforts of others" requirements of the
Howey test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
the loan participation agreement did not constitute a security.'38
A majority of courts faced with whether a loan participation is a
security have abandoned a literal, mechanical approach in favor of a
hybrid analysis similar to the one applied in Union Planters Bank.'39
Although some courts continue to apply a literal approach to loan par-
ticipations and other types of instruments, "' most courts have adopted a
substantive analysis for examining all types of alleged securities trans-
actions.' The literal approach, however, still plays an important part in
"3 Id. at 1184; see text accompanying notes 41-46 supra (Howey definition of profits).
651 F.2d at 1184-85.
"' Id. at 1185.
138 Id.
I Id. The Union Planters court distinguished the efforts of a borrower who worked to
repay a loan from the efforts of Commercial Credit who performed administrative tasks con-
nected with a loan. Id. Since Commercial Credit's administrative tasks were not similar to a
borrower's efforts to repay a loan, the court concluded that the participation failed the ef-
forts of others requirement of the Howey test. Id.
1" Id. The majority of courts to consider whether loan participations are securities
have held that the federal securities laws do not govern participations or interests in loans
or notes. See, e.g., Robbins v. First Am. Bank of Va., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,240 (N.D. Ill. 1981); American Fletcher Mortgage v. U.S. Steel, 635 F.2d
1247, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1982 (1981); United Bank of Nashville v.
Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1110 (5th Cir. 1980); Manchester Bank v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 497
F.Supp. 1304, 1309-13 (D. N.H. 1980); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankfort Trust Co., 468
F.Supp. 448, 452-55 (E.D. Pa. 1979); FBS Fin., Inc. v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,341 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
A minority of courts considering whether a loan participation is a security have con-
cluded that participations are securities. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln
First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); NBI Mort. Corp. v.
Chemical Bank [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) and
[1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'" See note 138 supra (majority of courts do not consider loan participations to be
securities).
"' See note 138 supra (minority of courts apply literal approach to loan participations).
"' See note 138 supra (majority of courts apply substantive analysis to loan participa-
tions); note 94 supra (substantive analysis applied to promissory note); note 170 infra
(substantive analysis applied to sale of stock in close corporation).
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examining whether the sale of 100 percent of a business' corporate stock
is a securities transaction under the '33 and '34 Acts.
14 2
IV. STOCK IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Both the '33 and '34 Acts include the term "stock" in the statutory
definition of a security.43 Unlike the stock certificates in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,'4 the stock in a normal close corporation
possesses all the traditional attributes of stock.' 41 Most corporate stock
is fully negotiable, possesses the right to vote, the right to receive
dividends, and the potential to appreciate in value.146 The sale of 100 per-
cent of the stock in a close corporation, therefore, apparently constitutes
a sale of a security under the federal securities laws.4 ' A detailed ex-
amination of the sale of a business, however, reveals that the transaction
predominantly is commercial in nature .' The question then arises
whether a court should literally apply the statutory definitions or apply
the economic realities test to determine if the federal securities laws
govern the sale of an entire business.
In Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks,'49 the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania held that the federal securities
laws governed the sale of 100 percent of a small strip mining company's
stock.5 0 The defendant argued that the economic realities test applied in
Forman demonstrated that the transaction actually was a sale of an on-
going business and not a sale of a security. 5' The Mifflin court, however,
interpreted Forman as requiring an economic realities analysis only
when the instrument in question was a "stock purchase agreement" and
did not possess the traditional attributes of stock. 52 The Mifflin court ex-
"2 See text accompanying notes 143-72 infra (sale of stock in close corporation under
federal securities law).
"' See notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security).
.. 421 U.S. 837 (1975); see text accompanying notes 47-58 supra (discussion of Forman).
"4 See text accompanying note 146 infra.
"' See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F.Supp. 350, 353-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Mifflin Energy
Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F.Supp. 334, 335-37 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
"' See notes 1 & 2 supra (statutory definitions of a security). See also Coffin v.
Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 142 (1979) (sale of
stock in close corporation governed by securities acts); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456
F.Supp. 445, 447-49 (D. Colo. 1978) (sale of stock in close corporation is securities transac-
tion); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.Supp. 925, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (sale of stock in family cor-
poration is a security).
"' See text accompanying notes 156-72 infra (sale of stock in close corporation does not
have attributes of securities transaction). Compare Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks,
501 F.Supp. 334, 335-37 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (sale of stock is automatically a securities transac-
tion) with Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F.Supp. 350, 353-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (sale of stock requires
application of economic realities test).
149 501 F.Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
Id. at 335.
"' Id. at 335-36; see text accompanying notes 47-58 supra (discussion of Forman).
501 F.Supp. at 335.
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amined the shares of stock and determined that they possessed the
traditional attributes of stock." The court determined that because the
sale of the business involved instruments commonly known as stock and
the statutory definition of a security included stock, the federal
securities laws applied to the sale transaction and the sale automatically
triggered the antifraud provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts. '54 The court ex-
plained that the fact that the transaction resulted in the sale of a
business was immaterial to the question of whether the stock was a
se'curity.'55
Although the Mifflin court refused to apply the economic realities
test to the sale of corporate stock, in Anchor-Darling Industries, Inc. v.
Suozzo,"6 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
adopted a broader reading of Forman and applied the economic realities
test to a sale of stock in three closely held corporations. 5 7 The court did
not inquire whether the shares of stock in question possessed the tradi-
tional attributes of stock.'58 Instead, the court examined the cir-
cumstances surrounding the stock sale to determine whether the trans-
action involved a security. 5 In the transaction, Anchor-Darling In-
dustries bought Suozzo's controlling interest in three closely held cor-
porations.1 0 The sale divested Suozzo of all ownership and of all posi-
tions in the companies.' Suozzo did, however, enter into consulting
agreements with the three corporations. 6' After the sale, Anchor-
Darling filed a rule 10b-5 action alleging Suozzo made several knowing
misrepresentations in the stock purchase agreement.'63
The Anchor-Darling court interpreted Forman as requiring an ap-
plication of the economic realities test every time an allegation of a sale
of a security is at issue.' The court applied the economic realities test
"5 Id. at 335-36.
"4Id. at 336.
' Id. The Mifflin court found that the actual sale of the stock was the substance of the
transaction and was not meant to represent a symbolic transfer of an indicia of ownership.
Id.
Many benefits accrue to parties who transfer ownership in a business by transferring
stock instead of selling a business' assets. See Comment, The Sale of a Close Corporation
Through A Stock Transfer: Covered by the Federal Securities Laws? 11 SETON HALL L.
REv. 749, 762, 763 n.100 (1981) (tax benefits and avoidance of federal securities laws). The
biggest advantage to selling stock instead of a corporation's assets is avoiding compliance
with state "bulk sale" laws. See U.C.C. Art. 6 (1981) (registration and notice to creditors re-
quired with bulk sales).
" 510 F.Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
7 Id. at 662-66.
"4 See id. at 663.
"4 Id. at 662-66.
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and held that the transaction did not involve a security because there
was not an investment in a common enterprise with an expectation of
profits to be derived from the efforts of another."5 The court concluded
that because Anchor-Darling in no way shared or pooled funds from the
companies with Suozzo, no common venture existed that would satisfy
the economic realities test.6 ' Since Anchor-Darling was solely responsi-
ble for the continued management of the companies and relied on no one
else to bring about the profits from the companies, 7 the court concluded
that the transaction did not satisfy the "profits derived from the efforts
of others" requirement of the Howey economic realities test. 6 '
The results in Mifflin are typical of cases applying a literal analysis
to whether the sale of an entire business is a security.'69 The analysis ap-
plied in Anchor-Darling, however, exemplifies the analysis employed by
most courts to determine the status of a sale of an entire business under
the federal securities laws.' Although language in the Supreme Court's
Forman opinion lends some support to the literal approach, 7 ' an ex-
amination of the entire Forman decision in light of other Supreme Court
opinions concerning the definition of a security reveals that the Supreme
Court overwhelmingly prefers using a substantive analysis to examine
alleged securities transactions. 2
A substantive analysis of all alleged securities transactions pro-
motes the congressional intent behind the federal securities laws. The
congressional purpose of the securities acts is to provide the investing
public with broad, easily obtained remedies for unscrupulous practices
in the securities market.' Congress, however, intended the broad
remedies of the securities acts to apply only to transactions that involve
a security. 4 A substantive analysis of the definition of a security,




169 See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 142 (1979); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.Supp. 445, 447-49 (D. Colo.
1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.Supp. 925, 929 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
1' See, e.g., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,815 (7th Cir. 1981); Chandler v. Kew, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. 1977); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F.Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Smogyi v. Butler, 518 F.Supp. 970, 987 (D.N.J. 1981); Dueker v. Turner, [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Bula v. Mansfield, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. 1977); Tech Resources, Inc. v.
Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 585-86, 272 S.E.2d 314, 316-17 (1980) (applying federal law).
171 See note 50 supra (discussion of Forman's support for literal approach).
,' See text accompanying notes 47-58 supra (Forman Court supports substantive ap-
proach); note 41 supra (Supreme Court decisions supporting substantive approach).
' See note 22 supra (congressional intent of securities laws).
... See Marine Bank v. Weaver, - U.S. -, _ , 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4287
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whether the analysis includes the commercial/investment distinction,17 5
the risk capital test,7 ' the economic realities test,' or a combination of
tests,' prevents turning the policy of broad, easily obtained remedies
under the federal securities laws' into a broad, expansive definition of a
security. The substantive approach allows only parties in transactions
with characteristics of securities transactions to obtain the broad
remedies of the securities acts. 8' The literal approach, however, permits
the securities acts to govern any transaction that includes an instrument
listed in the statutory definitions, regardless of whether the instrument
has the characteristics of a security."' The flexible standards of a
substantive approach protect the public from the countless and variable
schemes devised by persons seeking the use of other persons' money on
the promise of profits,"' and also avoids turning the securities laws into
a remedy for unhappy businessmen prevented from recovering damages
under state law.'
83
Courts should consider the instruments listed in the statutory defini-
tion of a security merely as examples of instruments that can be
securities."4 The presence of an instrument listed in the statutory defini-
tion should alert a court that the instrument could be a security. Once
alerted, a court then can apply a substantive analysis to determine if the
federal securities laws govern the transaction. If the statutory definition
(March 9, 1982) (Congress intended securities laws to cover instruments commonly con-
sidered securities); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (trans-
action must involve a security before '34 Act applies); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108,
122 (10th Cir. 1959) (securities laws not intended to apply to all transactions); note 22 supra
(congressional intent of securities laws).
"I See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra (commercial/investment dichotomy).
".. See text accompanying notes 78-86 supra (risk capital test).
rn See text accompanying notes 41-58 supra (economic realities test).
"' See text accompanying notes 125-38 supra (hybrid analysis applied to loan participa-
tions).
... See notes 18-27 supra (policy and broad remedies of '33 and '34 Acts).
' See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (land sales and service con-
tracts with characteristics of securities governed by federal securities laws); note 17 supra
(instruments without characteristics of securities not governed by securities statutes).
"' See Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974) (stock cer-
tificates without traditional attributes of stock are securities), rev'd sub nom. United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); text accompanying notes 67, 87-91, 108-16, 149-55
supra (literal approach to definition of a security).
"' See Marine Bank v. Weaver, __ U.S. 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286
(March 9, 1982) (quoting SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
" See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit, 651 F.2d 1174, 1175 (6th Cir.
1981) (securities laws do not provide an easy remedy for plaintiffs prevented from recovery
in state law claims); note 21 supra (securities laws are not panacea for commercial transac-
tions gone awry).
"' See Marine Bank v. Weaver, __ U.S. 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286
(March 9, 1982) (although "certificates of deposit" listed in statutory definition, label given
instrument is not controlling); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 842, 848-52
(1975) (instrument labeled "stock" puts courts on notice that a security may exist).
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does not list an alleged security, a court can apply the economic realities
test to determine if the instrument is an investment contract.1"'
Although courts outside the Second Circuit apparently apply a substan-
tive analysis to all alleged securities transactions, 8 ' if the Second Cir-
cuit's literal approach to the definition of a security gains widespread
popularity, the day will come when not a sparrow falls without the
securities laws nodding their assent.'87
C. DREW DEMARAY
"I See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (economic realities test applied
to sales and service contracts); text accompanying notes 35-57 supra (discussion of invest-
ment contracts and economic realities test).
' See text accompanying notes 41-57, 69-86, 125-38, 156-72 supra (substantive approach
to definition of a security); note 17 supra (cases applying substantive approach to alleged
securities transactions).
... See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367, 368 n.9 (1967); Matthew 10:29.
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